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We present a theoretical account of the origin of the shapes of utility, probability weighting, and tem-poral discounting functions. In an experimental test of the theory, we systematically change the shape
of revealed utility, weighting, and discounting functions by manipulating the distribution of monies, proba-
bilities, and delays in the choices used to elicit them. The data demonstrate that there is no stable mapping
between attribute values and their subjective equivalents. Expected and discounted utility theories, and also
their descendants such as prospect theory and hyperbolic discounting theory, simply assert stable mappings to
describe choice data and offer no account of the instability we find. We explain where the shape of the mapping
comes from and, in describing the mechanism by which people choose, explain why the shape depends on the
distribution of gains, losses, risks, and delays in the environment.
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1. Introduction
Central to our economic behavior are the attributes
money, probability, and time. Our representations of
these attributes are thought to determine our eco-
nomic behavior. Theories of decision under risk and
delay generally assume that we transform money,
probability, and delay into subjective equivalents, and
then integrate information across these equivalents.
These transformations are typically modeled using
utility (or value), weighting, and discounting func-
tions. In this paper we present a theory of choice
that accounts for the previously observed nature of
these functions. A prediction of this theory is that
these transformations are not stable, and four experi-
mental tests confirm this prediction. We show that by
manipulating the distribution of monies, probabilities,
and delays in the question set used to elicit utility,
weighting, and discounting functions, we can system-
atically change their shape; that is, we show that if
you ask different questions, the revealed subjective
values of given monies, probabilities, and delays can
be adjusted, to some extent, at the experimenter’s
will. This means that shape of utility, weighting, and
discounting functions is a property of the choice envi-
ronment and not just of the individual. We argue that
although it is possible to derive utility, weighting, and
discounting functions from behavioral data (such as
a series of choices), these functions do not describe
the process of choosing. Our theoretical account of
the choice process does not involve utility, weighting,
and discounting functions, but does explain both the
success of the traditional approach and also accounts
for the systematic variation of these functions across
question sets.
2. Decision Under Risk
Expected utility is the normative model for risky deci-
sion making (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1947).
In expected utility theory, wealth is translated into
utility by a utility function. To choose between risky
687
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Figure 1 Psychoeconomic Functions Convert (a) Probability, (b) Amount, and (c) Delay Into Their Subjective Equivalents
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options, the average or expected utility of each avail-
able course of action is calculated and the action max-
imizing expected utility is selected. Expected utility
theory is often paired with the assumption of dimin-
ishing marginal utility—the utility of my second $100,
for example, is just a little bit lower than the utility of
my first $100. To capture this, a concave utility func-
tion is used, which is initially quite steep, but then
later more flat showing a high sensitivity to initial
increases in wealth but then a lower sensitivity to later
increases.
Economists and psychologists have created a large
set of models of decision under risk that follow the
expected utility framework. Each model adapts util-
ity theory to incorporate some psychological insight
based, often, on observations of people’s choice
behavior. Prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky
1979, Tversky and Kahneman 1992) is perhaps the
most famous, but there are many other significant
theories (e.g., Birnbaum 2008, Birnbaum and Chavez
1997, Busemeyer and Townsend 1993, Edwards 1962,
Loomes and Sugden 1982, Quiggin 1993, Savage
1954). In prospect theory terminology, a value func-
tion converts money into value (the analogue of util-
ity), and a weighting function converts probability
into decision weight. Figures 1(a) and 1(b) give exam-
ple weighting and value functions.
The emphasis in prospect theory was to provide
a descriptive account of people’s risky decisions,
capturing departures from expected utility theory.
There are many important empirical departures (for
reviews, see Allais 1953, Birnbaum 2008, Camerer
1995, Loomes 2010, Luce 2000, Schoemaker 1982,
Starmer 2000), but here we use just two—the find-
ing that, in choices about gains, people are risk
averse for gambles involving medium and large
probabilities, but risk seeking for those involving
small probabilities—to illustrate how the shapes of
the value and weight functions were constructed
to account for choice data. Although Tversky and
Kahneman (1992) did motivate their functional forms
by assuming diminishing sensitivity to changes fur-
ther from reference points (zero for money and
zero and one for probability), the value and deci-
sion weighting functions are essentially descriptive,
designed to fit particular choice patterns. Consider
the shape of the value function for gains (the top right
quadrant of Figure 1(b)). In an initial choice between
(A) 3,000 for sure and (B) an 80% chance of 4,000
otherwise nothing, people are risk averse and prefer
A. In prospect theory, because the value function is
concave, the value of 3,000 is a bit more than 80%
of the value of 4,000, and so people prefer the sure
3,000; that is, the value function is concave for gains
to describe risk aversion.
The shape of the weighting function is also con-
structed to describe the choices that people make. In
a choice between (C) a 25% chance of 3,000 other-
wise nothing and (D) a 20% chance of 4,000 otherwise
nothing, people are risk seeking and prefer D. Because
the C–D choice is derived from the A–B choice by
multiplying probabilities by 1/4, participants should
prefer the A and C or prefer B and D. Their preference
for A and D, known as the common ratio effect (Allais
1953), is not consistent with expected utility theory.
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) account for these data
using the weighting function, in which people are
most sensitive to changes in small or large probabil-
ities and are least sensitive to changes in intermedi-
ate probabilities. Thus, the decision weights of 80%
and 100% are quite different, but the weights of 20%
and 25% are quite similar (see Figure 1(a)); that is,
the weighting function takes its inverse-S shape to
describe the common ratio effect (and other choice
patterns) that people make.
3. Decision Under Delay
The normative starting point for intertemporal
choices is discounted utility theory (Samuelson 1937).
When choosing between a series of delayed outcomes,
each outcome is discounted by reducing its value
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fro
m
 in
fo
rm
s.o
rg
 b
y 
[1
38
.40
.68
.13
2]
 on
 26
 M
arc
h 2
01
5, 
at 
10
:02
 . F
or
 pe
rso
na
l u
se
 on
ly,
 al
l r
igh
ts 
res
erv
ed
. 
Stewart, Reimers, and Harris: On the Origin of Utility, Weighting, and Discounting Functions
Management Science 61(3), pp. 687–705, © 2015 INFORMS 689
by a constant fraction for every unit of time it is
delayed. The value of a delayed outcome thus dimin-
ishes exponentially with the length of the delay, and
this leads to preferences that remain consistent over
time.
As with decision under risk, psychologists and
economists have modified this discounted utility
framework to incorporate psychological insight based
on observation. Perhaps the most significant model
is hyperbolic discounting (Ainslie 1975, Loewenstein
and Prelec 1992). Here we select one example behav-
ioral finding to illustrate the descriptive model, but
there are many (for reviews, see Loewenstein and
Prelec 1992, Scholten and Read 2010). In the common
difference effect people have a tendency to reverse
their preferences when a common interval is added or
subtracted from the delays of each option. For exam-
ple, in a choice between 100 in 10 days and 110 in
11 days, people might prefer the later larger reward
of 110 in 11 days. However, when the same rewards
are brought forward 9 days, so people are choos-
ing between 100 in 1 day and 110 in 2 days, people
might prefer the smaller sooner reward; that is, there
is more discounting in moving from 1 to 2 days than
from 10 to 11 days (Thaler 1981). To explain find-
ings like this, Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) (see also
Mazur 1987) suggested that discounting was hyper-
bolic, not exponential (see Figure 1(c)). One property
of a hyperbolic function is that the discount rate is ini-
tially high and then decreases. Thus, large discount-
ing from 1 to 2 days makes the smaller sooner option
relatively more attractive, but the reduced discount-
ing from 10 to 11 days makes the later larger option
relatively more attractive. Note that the motivation
for the choice of discounting function is the same as
the motivations for the choice of utility and weight-
ing functions: the goal is to describe the choices that
people make.
4. Malleability of Risky and
Delayed Choices
Below we review a series of studies that demon-
strate that choices and valuations of risky and delayed
choices are affected by the distributions of amounts,
probabilities, and delays recently experienced. These
findings are not consistent with expected utility, dis-
counted utility, or their derivatives. To foreshadow
the later theory section, in all of these studies, people
behave as if the subjective value of an amount, risk,
or delay is given by its rank position in the context
created by other recently experienced amounts, risks,
and delays.
In decision under risk, Stewart (2009) demonstrated
that a target choice between a 30% chance of 100
points and a 40% chance of 75 points can be reversed
by manipulating the distributions of probabilities and
amounts encountered just before the choice. When
previous choices contained amounts 25, 50, 75, 100,
125, and 150 points and probabilities 30%, 32%, 34%,
36%, 38%, and 40%, people preferred a 40% chance of
75 points. In making this choice, people are behaving
as if the difference in amounts is relatively small (the
ranks of 75 and 100 points are very similar, ranking
4th and 3rd, respectively), but the difference in prob-
abilities is relatively large (the ranks of 30% and 40%
are very different, ranking 6th and 1st, respectively).
If people feel that 40% is much better than 30% but
that 100 points is only slightly better than 75 points, a
40% chance of 75 points will be more attractive than
a 30% chance of 100 points. In contrast, when pre-
vious choices contained amounts 75, 80, 85, 90, 95,
and 100 points and probabilities 10%, 20%, 30%, 40%,
50%, and 60%, people preferred a 30% chance of 100
points. In this new context, the ranks of 30% and 40%
are very similar, but the ranks of 75 and 100 points
are very different.
Extending this design, Ungemach et al. (2011)
examined how the distribution of attribute values we
experience every day affects choices. In one study,
Ungemach et al. (2011) found that customers leaving
a supermarket evaluated the prizes on offer in two
simple lotteries against the cost of purchases made
a few minutes earlier inside a supermarket. One lot-
tery offered £1.50 with a low probability and the other
offered £0.50 with a high probability. If most pur-
chases were for amounts between £0.50 and £1.50,
people behaved as if the difference between £0.50 and
£1.50 was larger, and selected the £1.50 lottery. Alter-
natively, if most purchases were for less than £0.50 or
more than £1.50, people behaved as if the difference
between £0.50 and £1.50 was smaller, and selected the
£0.50 lottery, which has the higher probability of win-
ning. Ungemach et al. (2011) present similar findings
for probability when people generate a probability for
a weather event before making a risky choice and
for delay when people plan for their birthday before
making an intertemporal choice (see Matthews 2012
for a failure to replicate the birthday experiment and
Peetz and Wilson 2013 for a successful study using
birthdays as temporal landmarks). In both this study
and the previous study, the previously encountered
attribute values were irrelevant to the later choice,
but differences in the distributions of the previously
encountered attribute values were sufficient to reverse
preferences.
The distribution of prices also affects valuations.
Beauchamp et al. (2012), Birnbaum (1992), and
Stewart et al. (2003) found that when valuing a risky
gamble, people were influenced by the range and
skew of the options available as potential valua-
tions. For example, Birnbaum (1992) found that the
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valuation of a target gamble was higher when peo-
ple selected a valuation from a negatively skewed set
than from a positively skewed set. If perceived value
is, in part, determined by rank position, a particular
valuation will seem larger in the positively skewed
set (where it has a high rank position) than in a neg-
atively skewed set (where it has a low rank posi-
tion). Thus, the value of the target gamble is matched
to a lower valuation in the positively skewed set
(because the valuations seem higher) and a higher
valuation in the negatively skewed set (because the
valuations seem lower). Using an incentive compat-
ible auction, Mazar et al. (2014) found that the dis-
tribution of prices from which a sale price was to
be randomly drawn affected the reserve price stated
by participants in exactly the same way. With neg-
atively skewed sale prices (i.e., more larger prices),
stated reserve prices were higher than with posi-
tively skewed sale prices (i.e., more smaller prices).
An example of range affecting valuations is given
by Vlaev et al. (2009). They used a Becker–DeGroot–
Marschak auction to show that doubling the range
of prices from which a sale price was to be drawn
doubled the price people would pay to avoid a series
of electric shocks. Haggag and Paci (2013) report a
similar effect in a natural experiment where taxi cus-
tomers give higher tips when offered 20%, 25%, and
30% as potential defaults compared to 15%, 20%, and
25%—there could be other causes for this taxi tip
effect, but it is consistent with the rank hypothesis.
In making a single choice, the available options also
affect the level of risk demonstrated in that choice.
Benartzi and Thaler (2001) examined a natural experi-
ment. Employees were asked to allocate their pension
funds between bonds (relatively safe) and stocks (rel-
atively risky). Although all employees were offered at
least one stock option and at least one bond option,
and thus all employees could exhibit whatever level
of risk they preferred, employees made, on aver-
age, more risky investments if there were more stock
options available. Benartzi and Thaler (2001) account
for this pattern with the 1/n heuristic, which assumes
people place equal funds into each option, but the
allocation is also compatible with the rank hypothesis.
Stewart et al. (2003) examine a laboratory analogue,
where people are offered either five risky options or
five safe options. Participants in the different con-
ditions behaved as though they had different levels
of risk aversion, even though participants were ran-
domly assigned to different groups. It is as if the risk-
iness of an option is a function of its rank position
within the context against which it is evaluated.
5. A Theoretical Account
To summarize the above studies, people behave as if
the subjective value of an amount (or probability or
delay) is determined, at least in part, by its rank posi-
tion in the set of values currently in a person’s head.
So, for example, $10 has a higher subjective value in
the set $2, $5, $8, and $15 because it ranks 2nd, but
has a lower subjective value in the set $2, $15, $19,
and $25 because it ranks 4th.
This suggestion—that subjective value is rank
within a sample—is consistent with Parducci’s (1965,
1995) range-frequency model of magnitudes. In this
model, the subjective value of a magnitude is, in part,
given by its rank position. This descriptive model
began as an account of scaling of psychophysical
quantities, but has more recently been applied in eco-
nomic contexts such as wage satisfaction (Brown et al.
2008, Boyce 2009).
Stewart et al. (2006) (see also Stewart 2009) pro-
posed the decision-by-sampling model of decision
making in which the subjective value of an attribute,
whether money, probability, or delay, is its rank posi-
tion in a sample of attributes. (The model is moti-
vated by evidence from psychophysical studies of the
representation of magnitudes.) In decision by sam-
pling, rank emerges from the application of three sim-
ple cognitive tools: sampling, binary comparison, and
frequency accumulation. Continuing the above exam-
ple, $10 is compared to a sample of other amounts in
memory: $2, $5, $8, and $15. In binary comparisons,
$10 looks good compared to $2, $5, and $8, but looks
bad compared to $15. By accumulating the number of
favorable comparisons across the sample, $10 is val-
ued at 3/4, because three of the four comparisons are
favorable.
Stewart et al. (2006) show how these assumptions
are sufficient to derive psychoeconomic functions like
those in prospect and hyperbolic discounting the-
ories. The left column of Figure 2 shows the dis-
tributions of gains, losses, risks, and delays in the
real world. Assuming that people’s memories reflect
the world in which they live, Stewart et al. (2006)
used these real-world distributions as approximations
of the contents of people’s memories and estimated
the value, weighting, and discounting functions that
would be observed under decision by sampling (right
column). The top left panel is the distribution of
probability phrases occurring in everyday English.
People prefer to use verbal phrases rather than num-
bers. In a new analysis, we find that of the first
500 sentences in the British National Corpus contain-
ing the six-letter string “chance,” 65 are about the
probability of an event and, of these, 60 use ver-
bal phrases and 5 use numbers. And for responses
to the open question of Ungemach et al. (2011,
p. 256), “How likely do you think it is to rain
tomorrow?,” 340 involved verbal phrases and 47
involved numbers. The top right panel is the result-
ing weighting function expected if people compare
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Figure 2 Real-World Attribute-Value Distributions (a) and the Resulting Psychoeconomic Functions (b) for Probability (Top), Money (Middle), and
Delay (Bottom)
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Source. Adapted from Stewart et al. (2006, Figures 1, 2, 5, 6, 7).
Note. See the text for details.
probabilities against those they encounter in every-
day English. The function is inverse S-shaped because
high- and low-probability phrases are more frequent
than intermediate-probability phrases. The function
is asymmetrical because high-probability phrases are
more frequent than low-probability phrases. The mid-
dle row repeats the exercise for value. The real-world
distributions on the left are for credits and debits to
bank accounts and are positively skewed. The right
panel shows the resulting value functions if people
compare gains and losses against these credits and
debits. Notice how, because there are more small
gains in the world than large gains, the value func-
tion is concave for gains: Against the distribution of
gains, a £100 increase in a prize from £100 to £200
improves the rank position substantially more than a
£100 increase from £900 to £1,000. The bottom row
repeats the exercise for time. The left panel shows
the frequency with which different delays occur in
text on the Internet. The right panel shows the result-
ing weighting function if people compare delays to
the real-world distribution on the Internet. (Because
larger losses and delays are worse than shorter losses
and delays, they have been plotted with negative
ranks.) Notice the resemblance between these func-
tions and the descriptive functions from prospect and
hyperbolic discounting theories in Figure 1.
In independent work, Kornienko (2011) shows for-
mally how the decision-by-sampling tools provide
a cognitive basis for cardinal utility. Stewart and
Simpson (2008) provide details of a decision-by-
sampling process model of Kahneman and Tversky’s
(1979) data. An online decision-by-sampling calcu-
lator, which gives exact choice probabilities for any
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set of prospects, is available at http://www.stewart
.warwick.ac.uk.
Equation (1) formalizes the expression for the sub-
jective value of an attribute, although this is hardly
necessary for such a simple theory. The subjective
value s4x1Y 5 of a target attribute value x in the
context of a distribution of n attribute values Y =
8y11y21 0 0 0 1 yn9 is given by
s4x1Y 5=
∑
y∈Y c4x1y5
n
1 (1)
where
c4x1y5=


1 if x compares favorably to y1
0 if x does not compare
favorably to y0
(2)
The subjective value s4x1Y 5 is the probability of a
favorable comparison between x and a randomly
selected member of set Y . Equivalently, s4x1Y 5 is
the rank of x in Y , normalized to lie between zero
and one.
A strong prediction of these rank-based accounts
is that if one alters the distribution of attribute val-
ues encountered, the subjective value of any given
attribute should alter too. We call this the rank
hypothesis. Here we test this prediction for money,
probability, and delay. Figure 3 shows hypothetical
psychoeconomic functions for some of the different
samples of attribute values used in the present exper-
iments. For each attribute, two distributions are con-
sidered. The subjective value of the attribute within
the distribution from which it was drawn is plotted
against its objective value. Notice how the functions
Figure 3 Hypothetical Psychoeconomic Functions for Probability (Left), Amount (Center), and Delay (Right)
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Note. The subjective value of an attribute is its rank within the distribution of other attribute values (shown above each plot), normalized to lie between zero
and one.
are steepest where the distribution of attribute values
is most dense and are shallowest where the distri-
bution of attribute values is least dense. For exam-
ple, consider the manipulation of the distribution of
amounts (center panel of Figure 3). For the positively
skewed amounts, the value function first increases
quickly, as fixed-magnitude increases in amount cor-
respond to large increases in rank within the sample,
and then later slowly, as fixed-magnitude increases
in amount correspond to small increases in rank
within the sample. Thus, a positively skewed set of
amounts should give a concave utility function. For
the negatively skewed amounts, the value function
first increases slowly, as fixed-magnitude increases
in amount correspond to a small increase in rank
within the sample, and then later quickly, as fixed-
magnitude increases in amount correspond to larger
increases in rank within the sample. Thus, a nega-
tively skewed set of amounts should give a convex
utility function. Experiments 1 and 2 explore risky
decisions and investigate how changing the distri-
bution of amounts and probabilities used to build
a set of choices changes the psychoeconomic func-
tions revealed from those choices. Experiments 3 and
4 repeat this exercise for intertemporal choices.
We do not expect the experimental results to be
as extreme as those in Figure 3 because participants
are likely to bring previous experience with money,
risk, and delay into the laboratory. Consider, for exam-
ple, the manipulation of the distribution of amounts
of money. From Stewart et al. (2006), we know that
the distributions of money in the world are positively
skewed, with small amounts being highly frequent
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and larger amounts more rare. Thus, in an experi-
mental condition with positively skewed amounts of
money, the distribution the participant has in mind
will be a mixture of the positively skewed experimen-
tal distribution and the positively skewed real-world
distribution. Thus, the net distribution participants
have in mind will be positively skewed, and the result-
ing utility function, under the rank hypothesis, will be
concave. But in an experimental condition with a neg-
atively skewed distribution, the distribution the par-
ticipant has in mind will be a mixture of the negatively
skewed experimental distribution and the positively
skewed real-world distribution. In this case, the net
distribution participants experience will be closer to
uniform, and thus the resulting utility function, under
the rank hypothesis, will be closer to linear. Thus, the
core prediction is that manipulating the distribution of
amounts will give rise to a utility function that is more
concave in the positive-skew condition compared to
the negative-skew condition—we predict a relative
difference in concavity between conditions, with the
absolute concavity being determined (in the decision-
by-sampling theory) by the unmeasured contribution
of the real-world distribution of amounts. More gen-
erally, it is the relative differences in the shapes of the
revealed utility, weighting, and discounting functions
that test the rank hypothesis, rather than the absolute
shapes of these functions.
To preempt later results, manipulating the distri-
bution of amounts, probabilities, and delays system-
atically and predictably alters the pattern of choices
that people make, and thus alters the psychoeconomic
functions that best describe the data. In fitting these
functions, we do not claim that people are using psy-
choeconomic functions inside their heads. Instead we
fit functions to demonstrate that, within the standard
frameworks of prospect theory (or subjective expected
utility) and of hyperbolic discounting, the shape of
a revealed psychoeconomic function is due not to a
person’s stable risk or intertemporal preferences, but
instead, at least in part, to the experimenter’s choice
of attribute values used in the experiment.
6. Experiments
6.1. Experiment 1A
Participants made choices of the form “p chance of x,
otherwise nothing” or “q chance of y, otherwise noth-
ing.” Each choice was between a smaller probability
of a larger amount of money or a larger probability of
a smaller amount of money. Between participants, the
distribution of amounts available was manipulated to
be either positively skewed or negatively skewed.
6.1.1. Method. Participants. Forty-one Warwick
psychology first-year undergraduates participated.
Course credit was given for attending. In addition,
for each participant, the gambles they selected on
two randomly sampled choices were played via urn
draws. After applying an experiment exchange rate to
any winnings, participants could win up to £5.
Data from four participants were deleted for violat-
ing stochastic dominance on more than 10% of catch
trials (see below), though including these data in the
analysis does not alter the pattern of results. Most
participants in this experiment, and the others in this
paper, made no catch-trial errors.
Design. A set of five probabilities was crossed with
a set of six amounts to create 30 gambles of the
form “p chance of x, otherwise nothing.” All partic-
ipants experienced probabilities 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, and
1.0. Participants were randomly assigned to receive
either a positively or a negatively skewed set of
amounts (see Figure 3, center panel). The positively
skewed set contained amounts £10, £20, £50, £100,
£200, and £500. The negatively skewed set was the
mirror image of the positively skewed set with the
same range, and was constructed by subtracting each
amount from £510.
The 30 gambles were used to create a set of all pos-
sible pairwise choices between them. Choices between
identical gambles and choices where one gamble
stochastically dominated the other were dropped to
leave 150 choices between a small probability of
a large amount and a large probability of a small
amount. In addition, 30 of the choices where one gam-
ble stochastically dominated the other were included
as catch trials to detect participants who were not
making considered choices. Choices and instructions
for all experiments are available at http://www
.stewart.warwick.ac.uk.
Procedure. Participants were tested individually.
Written and spoken instructions explained that par-
ticipants would be asked to make a series of choices
between pairs of gambles. They were told to think
of each gamble as an urn draw game in which the
urn contained 100 balls, with the percentage of win-
ning balls matching the percentage chance of winning
the gamble. It was explained that drawing a winning
ball would result in receiving the amount in the gam-
ble, and that nonwinning balls would result in noth-
ing. Participants were told that they would randomly
select two choices at the end of the experiment, with
urn draws made for their selected gambles to deter-
mine their winnings. The amounts and probabilities
on offer were displayed in lists at the top of the screen
to remind participants of the attributes they would
experience.
Each choice was presented as two buttons, one for
each gamble. Each button had text describing the
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gamble. For example, for one choice in the positive-
skew condition, one button was labeled “60% chance
of £200,” and the other was labeled “100% chance of
£10.” The assignment of gamble to button was made
randomly on each trial. Participants clicked their
preferred gamble with the mouse. The next choice
appeared automatically. The ordering of choices was
set randomly for each participant. A progress bar at
the bottom of the screen tracked the progress of the
participant through the experiment.
Note that in all of the experiments reported here,
payments were incentive compatible (except Experi-
ment 1C), and there was no deception.
6.1.2. Results and Discussion. For each partic-
ipant, raw data were the 150 choices between a
relatively safe gamble offering a “q chance of y, other-
wise nothing” and a relatively risky gamble offering
a “p chance of x, otherwise nothing,” where q > p and
y < x. To recover the subjective values of the amounts
of money, we fitted Equation (3) to the choice
data:
Prob4safe5=
biascond6qucond4y57
cond
biascond6qucond4y57
cond+6pucond4x57
cond
1 (3)
where q ucond4y5 is the expected utility of the safe gam-
ble in condition cond, and pucond4x5 is the expected
utility of the risky gamble in condition cond. This
Luce (1959)–Shepard (1957) choice formulation is a
straightforward way to incorporate a stochastic com-
ponent in the expected utility model, giving an
increasing probability of selecting the safe gamble as
the utility of the safe gamble increases or the util-
ity of the risky gamble decreases. The  parame-
ter controls the degree of determinism in the model:
 = 1 gives choice probabilities proportional to the
expected utilities, and  > 1 gives more extreme
choice probabilities, so gambles with only slightly
higher expected utility are very likely to be cho-
sen. The bias parameter allows for an overall bias
toward safe or risky choices independently of the
amounts and probabilities in the gambles. (Though
we do find bias differences in some experiments, fix-
ing bias across conditions produces almost identical
revealed utility, weighting, and discounting functions
and the same pattern of statistical significance in for
every experiment in this paper, except in two places
we note below.) The cond subscripts indicate that the
utility function u4 5 can differ between conditions, as
can the  and bias parameters. Appendix A explains
how ucond4amounti5 was estimated for each amounti in
each condition as part of an off-the-shelf mixed-effects
logistic regression and reports the full set of estimated
parameters.
The revealed utility functions that maximize the
likelihood of the choice data are shown in Figure 4(a).
Figure 4 Utility Functions for Experiments 1A–1C
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Without loss of generality, the utility of £500 was set
at 1. Effectively, the logistic regression adjusted the
heights of each point in the utility functions to best
fit the choices participants made. Though they were
not constrained to do so, functions increase mono-
tonically. The utility function for the positive-skew
condition is concave, whereas the utility function
for the negative-skew condition is convex. Parame-
ter standard errors indicate that the functions differ
significantly. As a summary test of the difference in
concavity, we found that the best fitting power cond
for utility functions ucond4x5= x
cond differ significantly
across conditions (2415= 6036, p = 00012). Figure B.1
in Appendix B reports estimates for bias, , and 
for each condition and the differences between con-
ditions with bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals
and shows significant  differences for this experi-
ment and the later experiments. And this is the core
result: Participants who experienced a different dis-
tribution of amounts chose as if they had a different
shaped utility function. In particular, participants in
the positive-skew condition value £200 more than par-
ticipants in the negative-skew condition value £310,
even though £200 is smaller than £310 (2415 = 7005,
p= 000079).
Do these effects depend on extensive experience
with the distributions? We do not think so. Splitting
the data for each participant into the first and second
halves of the experiment and conducting the analysis
separately for each half (for this and later experi-
ments) revealed the same sized effect. This is unsur-
prising, given attribute distribution effects can take
place in as few as 10 trials (Stewart 2009) or after pur-
chasing a few items in a shop (Ungemach et al. 2011).
6.2. Experiment 1B
Experiments 1B and 1C are systematic replications
of Experiment 1A. Both follow the design of Experi-
ment 1A, except for the differences noted here.
6.2.1. Method. Participants. Fifty-six first-year
undergraduates participated in Experiment 1B. Each
experiment in this paper used a different set of
participants. For each participant, the gamble they
selected on one randomly sampled choice was played
via an urn draw. After applying an experiment
exchange rate to any winnings, participants could
win up to 5. No participants violated stochastic
dominance on more than 10% of catch trials, so all
data were retained.
Design. Participants were randomly assigned to
receive either a positive-skew condition with amounts
£0, £10, £20, £50, £100, £200, and £500, or uniform
condition with amounts £0, £100, £200, £300, £400,
and £500. Otherwise gambles and choices were con-
structed as in Experiment 1A. The uniform con-
dition replaces the negative-skew condition from
Experiment 1A to make the study more represen-
tative of distributions used in other experiments
and so that £100 and £200 are common across
conditions.
Procedure. This replication omitted the panel of
attribute values listing the amounts and probabilities
on offer, which one reviewer was concerned might be
driving the effects. Instead participants only saw the
series of choices, so any effects of distribution would
have to be the effect of the attributes viewed on ear-
lier choices affecting later choices.
6.2.2. Results and Discussion. Figure 4(b) shows
a concave utility function for a positive-skew con-
dition and a linear utility function for a uniform
condition. The difference in concavity is significant
(2415= 6099, p= 000082). In this experiment, amounts
£100 and £200 are common to both distributions, but
the revealed values are higher in the positive-skew
condition because their rank position in the distribu-
tion is higher (2415 = 26096, p < 000001 for the dif-
ference at £100, and 2415 = 7016, p = 000074 for the
difference at £200).
6.3. Experiment 1C
6.3.1. Method. Experiment 1C replicates Experi-
ments 1A and 1B using an online sample of UK
survey participants making hypothetical rather than
incentivized choices. One hundred twenty-four par-
ticipants completed the experiment in their Web
browsers. Data from 17 participants were deleted for
violating dominance on more than 10% of catch tri-
als, though these deletions do not alter the pattern of
results. Conditions were as Experiment 1B except the
£0 amounts were dropped.
6.3.2. Results and Discussion. Figure 4(c) plots
the utility functions recovered for the positive-skew
and uniform conditions, replicating the concave and
linear utility functions from Experiment 1B. Fits of
power law utility functions shows the difference in
concavity is marginal (2415 = 3050, p = 0006). (This
marginal result is significant when bias is held con-
stant across conditions.) There are significant differ-
ences in values at £100, 2415= 59079 and p < 000001,
and £200, 2415= 50047 and p < 000001.
Finally, we note that Mullett (2012) has repli-
cated Experiment 1A using a within-participants
manipulation where the prices of different categories
of product (holidays versus mobile phones) dif-
fered in skew, and Matthews (2013) has replicated
Experiment 1A using a within-participants manipu-
lation where two different gamble sets with differ-
ent amount distributions were offered by different
experimenters.
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6.4. Experiment 2A
In Experiment 2A, the distribution of probabilities
was manipulated between participants, and the dis-
tribution of amounts was held constant. In other
respects, the method was the same as Experi-
ments 1A–1C.
6.4.1. Method. Participants. Thirty-five Warwick
psychology first-year undergraduates participated for
course credit. In addition, participants knew they
could win up to £5 performance-related pay. No par-
ticipants violated stochastic dominance on more than
10% of catch trials, so all data were retained.
Design. Gambles were made by crossing a set of
probabilities with a set of amounts. The amounts
were £100, £200, £300, £400, and £500. The set of
probabilities was manipulated between participants
(see Figure 3, left panel) and was either positively
skewed (10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, 70%, 90%) or negatively
skewed (10%, 30%, 60%, 70%, 80%, 90%). The neg-
atively skewed set is the mirror image of the pos-
itively skewed set. Choices were made by crossing
gambles. One hundred twenty nonstochastically dom-
inated choices were selected at random and combined
with 30 stochastically dominated choices selected at
random.
Procedure. Because probabilities were the focus of
this experiment, we wanted to be sure that partic-
ipants understood the probabilities and the method
for resolving them. In this study, probabilities were
resolved by drawing 1 of 100 numbered chips from a
bag. To be successful, a number smaller than or equal
to the probability (as a percentage) had to be drawn.
For example, for a “70% chance £100” gamble, £100
Figure 5 Utility Functions for Experiments 2A and 2B
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Note. Error bars are standard errors.
was received if one of the numbers 1–70 was drawn;
numbers 71–100 led to no prize. This procedure was
explained to participants before they commenced the
experiment. The experimenter showed participants
the chips in an ordered 10× 10 grid, sweeping their
hands over the array to indicate, for several example
probabilities, which chips were winning chips. The
participant then had the opportunity to ask any ques-
tions before the experiment began.
6.4.2. Results and Discussion. The analysis re-
peats the procedure from Experiment 1, except
subjective probabilities instead of utilities varied
between conditions; that is, we fitted
Prob4safe5
=
biascond6wcond4q5y7
cond
biascond6wcond4q5y7
cond + 6wcond4p5x7
cond
1 (4)
where wcond4p5 gives the weighting of probability p
in condition cond. Figure 5(a) shows the revealed
weighting functions. With weighting functions con-
strained to follow power laws, the test of a difference
in concavity did not reach significance (2415 = 2018,
p = 0013). However, modeling with free weightings
revealed significant differences across conditions for
the common 30% (2415= 18018, p < 000001) and 70%
(2415= 14031, p= 000002).
6.5. Experiment 2B
6.5.1. Method. Experiment 2B is a systematic rep-
lication of Experiment 2A with more highly skewed
distributions, and differs only as noted here. Thirty-
six Warwick psychology first-year undergraduates
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participated. The positive-skew condition used proba-
bilities 1%, 2%, 5%, 10%, 50%, and 99%. The negative-
skew condition used probabilities 1%, 50%, 90%, 95%,
98%, and 99%. No participant violated dominance
in more than 10% of catch trials, so all data were
retained.
6.5.2. Results and Discussion. Figure 5(b) shows
that the weighting function in the positive-skew
condition is more concave than the negative-skew
condition. Modeling using power law weighting
functions reveals a significant difference between con-
ditions (2415 = 18105, p < 000001). Modeling with
free weightings tested whether the weighting for the
common probability 50% differed across conditions.
The weighting of 50% is significantly higher in the
positive-skew condition (2415 = 41072, p < 000001),
consistent with the rank hypothesis.
6.6. Experiment 3A
In Experiments 3A, 3B, and 4, we repeat Experi-
ments 1 and 2, but using delay instead of risk. Par-
ticipants made choices of the form “x at time t” or
“y at time u.” Each choice was between a later larger
amount and a smaller sooner amount. In Experiments
3A and 3B, the distribution of amounts was manip-
ulated between participants, and the distribution of
delays was held constant.
6.6.1. Method. Participants. Forty Warwick psy-
chology first-year undergraduates participated for
course credit. In addition, participants knew that one
participant would be drawn at random and paid
according to their selection on one randomly drawn
choice. Payment was by bank transfer on the day set
by their choice of delay. After applying an experiment
exchange rate, participants could win up to £20.
Data from four participants were deleted for vio-
lating dominance on more than 10% of catch trials,
though including these data in the analysis does not
alter the pattern of results.
Design. Delayed options were made by crossing a
set of delays with a set of amounts. All participants
received delays of one day, two days, one week, two
weeks, one month, two months, six months, and one
year. The distribution of amounts was either posi-
tively or negatively skewed, with values from Exper-
iment 1 (see Figure 3, center panel). One hundred
twenty nondominated choices were selected at ran-
dom and combined with 30 stochastically dominated
choices selected at random.
6.6.2. Results and Discussion. The analysis re-
peats the procedure from Experiment 1, with the sub-
jective values of amounts estimated by maximum
likelihood; that is, we fitted
Prob4sooner5
=
biascond6vcond4y5/u7
cond
biascond6vcond4y5/u7
cond + 6vcond4x5/t7
cond
1 (5)
where y at time u is a smaller sooner offer, and x at
time t is a later larger offer; vcond4x5 gives the utility
of amount x in condition cond. Figure 6(a) shows the
revealed utility functions. The utility functions dif-
fer between conditions. The utility function for the
positive-skew condition is relatively linear, whereas
the utility function for the negative-skew condition is
convex. Crucially, the difference in the utility func-
tions is in the direction expected: the function is
more concave in the positive-skew condition than the
negative-skew condition (2415 = 4049, p = 00034). As
in Experiment 1A, £200 receives a higher valuation in
the positive-skew condition than £310 in the negative-
skew condition (2415 = 3089, p = 00047). (The signif-
icant difference in the valuation of £200 and £310 is
only marginally significant when bias is held constant
across conditions.)
6.7. Experiment 3B
6.7.1. Method. Experiment 3B is a replication of
Experiment 3A. Nineteen first-year Warwick under-
graduates participated for course credit. The incen-
tive for the randomly drawn participant was up to
£50. The only other difference from Experiment 3A
was that we used an even more positively skewed
set of common delays (one day, two days, one week,
one month, and one year). No participants violated
dominance on more than 10% of catch trials, so all
data were retained.
6.7.2. Results and Discussion. Figure 6(b) plots
the utility functions. The results are very similar, with
a significant difference in concavity (2415= 6063, p=
00010), though the conservative £200–£310 comparison
only approached significance (2415= 3050, p= 00061).
6.8. Experiment 4
6.8.1. Method. In Experiment 4 the distribution
of delays was manipulated, and the distribution of
amounts was held constant. In all other respects, the
method was the same as Experiments 3A and 3B.
Participants. Thirty Warwick psychology first-year
undergraduates participated for course credit. Partic-
ipants knew that one participant would be drawn at
random and paid according to one of their choices.
Data from five participants were deleted for violating
dominance on more than 10% of catch trials, though
including these data in the analysis does not alter the
pattern of results.
Design. Options were made by crossing a set of
delays with a set of amounts. The amounts were
£100, £200, £300, £400, and £500. The set of delays
was manipulated between participants (see Figure 3,
right panel) and was either positively skewed (1 day,
2 days, 1 week, 2 weeks, 1 month, 2 months, 6 months,
and 1 year) or uniformly distributed (1 day, 2 months,
4 months, 6 months, 8 months, 10 months, and
1 year).
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Figure 6 Utility Functions for Experiments 3A and 3B
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Note. Error bars are standard errors.
6.8.2. Results and Discussion. The analysis re-
peats the procedure from earlier experiments, with
weightings of delays allowed to vary between condi-
tions; that is, we fitted
Prob4sooner5
=
biascond6wcond4u5y7
cond
biascond6wcond4u5y7
cond + 6wcond4t5x7
cond
1 (6)
where wcond4t5 gives the weighting of delay t in con-
dition cond. Figure 7 shows the revealed delay dis-
counting functions. The delay discounting function is
Figure 7 The Delay Discounting Functions for Experiment 4
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Note. Error bars are standard errors.
initially much steeper in the positive-skew condition
and much closer to linear in the uniform condition.
Modeling with discounting functions constrained to
follow power laws showed a significant difference
in curvature (2415 = 22025, p < 000001). Modeling
with free weights revealed that, for the common two-
month and six-month delays, people behaved as if
they weighted delayed amounts less heavily in the
positive-skew condition compared to the uniform
condition, 2415= 15045, p < 000001.
We note here the difference between this discount-
ing rank effect and subadditivity. Subadditivity is the
empirical finding that discounting measured over a
larger interval is less than that estimated by multi-
plying discounting over constituent subintervals (e.g.,
Scholten and Read 2006). Here we find more dis-
counting of delays in conditions where the distribu-
tion is more positively skewed. So subadditivity is
about whether discounting within a condition is con-
sistent when estimated over smaller or larger inter-
vals, whereas the present discounting rank effect is
about how discounting changes across conditions.
The theoretical account of subadditivity is also differ-
ent. Scholten and Read (2006, 2010) explain subaddi-
tivity by assuming that delay differences rather than
absolute delays are the psychological primitives that
are transformed by a stable discounting function, and
offer no account of these rank effects. The decision-by-
sampling account of rank effects works without any
such transformation (Vlaev et al. 2011).
7. General Discussion
Experimentally manipulating the distribution of
money (Experiments 1 and 3), probabilities (Experi-
ment 2), and delays (Experiment 4) people experience
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alters the choices people make, which in turn alters
the psychoeconomic functions constructed to describe
those choices. The effect of the distribution of attribute
values on the subjective function for those attribute
values was the same for money, probability, and time:
The subjective function was steepest when the dis-
tribution of attribute values was most dense, so that
more positively skewed distributions resulted in con-
cave functions. The shape of revealed utility, weight-
ing, and discounting functions is, at least in part, a
property of the question set and not the individual.
7.1. Psychological Implications
The literature on choices between gambles docu-
ments many choice set effects and other violations of
expected utility theory. One fix is to change the psy-
chological primitive (e.g., from wealth to gains/losses
(Kahneman et al. 1991, Kahneman and Tversky 1979)
or from cumulative probability distributions to risk-
reward branches (Birnbaum 2008)). Another fix is
to assume more complexity in the transformation of
objective into subjective values (e.g., with the four-
fold pattern motivating the inverse-S weighting func-
tion, Kahneman and Tversky 1979). The effects we
present here are different. They are not accounted for
by a change of primitive or a change in the trans-
formation between objective and subjective values. So
accounts based around the expected or discounted
utility framework do not explain the results. Psycho-
logically, the translation between objective and sub-
jective values is not well modeled as a lookup process
using some stable function or table. We have pro-
posed the decision-by-sampling model as an explana-
tion in which attribute values are evaluated against
other attribute values in working memory. Because
working memory reflects the distribution of money,
probability, and delay in the environment, valua-
tions will vary across experimental or environmental
distributions.
The process claims about memory embodied in
decision by sampling may offer an explanation for
the link between individual differences in memory
and intelligence and decision making. Higher intelli-
gence, which is associated with higher working mem-
ory capacity, is associated with less risk aversion and
less discounting (Benjamin et al. 2013, Burks et al.
2009, Dohmen et al. 2010, Shamosh and Gray 2008),
and experimentally reducing working memory capac-
ity increases discounting and risk aversion (Hinson
et al. 2003, Whitney et al. 2008). As speculation, we
propose that decision by sampling may predict these
effects because those with lower working memory
capacity will be more dominated by the immediate
experimental context (which typically will induce risk
aversion and discounting; see below) and less influ-
enced by extraexperiment attribute values.
7.2. Application in Economics
Gul and Pesendorfer (2005) explain that economists
are often only interested in choice behaviour, because
only actual choices affect institutions and markets.
Thus, evidence from psychology and neuroeconomics
about brain states or about the difference between
what people actually choose and what they wanted
to choose is not relevant. So while the decision-by-
sampling explanation may not be of direct interest
to economics, our experiments—which are just about
choices—should be. The experiments show that, to
describe an individual, the three single curves for the
utility of money and the weighting of delays and
probabilities in Figure 1 need to be replaced with
three books of curves with pages for each attribute-
distribution context. However, using a separate func-
tion for each possible context leaves the relationship
between the attribute-value distribution and the func-
tion unexplained.
The models of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006, 2007)
and Maccheroni et al. (2009a, b) both incorporate
the notion that the subjective value of an attribute
depends on the distribution of attribute values. These
models differ from decision by sampling in including
a stable classical utility component and, for Ko˝szegi
and Rabin (2006, 2007), their comparison to the ref-
erence distribution is cardinal, not ordinal. But, like
decision by sampling, both of these models involve
a comparison to a reference distribution: Ko˝szegi and
Rabin (2006, 2007) assume the distribution is of (ratio-
nal) expected outcomes, Maccheroni et al. (2009a, b)
assume it is the outcomes of peers, and Stewart et al.
(2006) assume it is the attribute values in memory—
and these values could well include expected out-
comes or the outcomes of others.
7.3. Previous Investigations of the Shapes of
Utility, Weighting, and Discounting Functions
Previous investigations tend to find concave utility
functions, inverse-S-shaped probability weighting
functions, and hyperbolic-like discounting functions.
Why? The answer, we think, is in the choice of
attribute-value distributions used in these experi-
ments. The essential observation here is that, quite
sensibly, functions are typically measured in more
detail (i.e., at more closely spaced intervals) where
they are expected to change most quickly. Take, for
example, the seminal study by Gonzalez and Wu
(1999) on the shapes of utility and weighting func-
tions. The open circles in Figure 8 plot the empirical
utility and weighting functions that Gonzalez and Wu
recovered. The lines on the plots show the functions
predicted by decision by sampling assuming that
the set of gambles offered to participants provides
the distribution of attribute values against which the
amounts and probabilities were compared. For both
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Figure 8 Empirically Derived Utility (Left) and Weighting (Right) Functions from Gonzalez and Wu (1999)
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Notes. Circles plot the functions that Gonzalez and Wu recovered. The solid line plots the predictions of decision-by-sampling theory.
the utility and weighting functions, the functions pre-
dicted under this simple rank hypothesis show the
same qualitative pattern seen in the empirical func-
tions: Because there were more small amounts than
large amounts, the utility function is steeper for small
amounts and flatter for large amounts, and because
there were more small and large probabilities than
intermediate probabilities, the weighting function is
steeper for small and large probabilities than for
intermediate probabilities. Because Gonzalez and Wu
(1999) used a distribution of probabilities symmetrical
around 0.5, the rank hypothesis does not predict the
asymmetry in the empirical weighting function. But,
if participants also recalled probabilities from outside
the experiment from a distribution with more larger
probabilities, like that in Figure 2, the rank hypothesis
does predict the asymmetry. Therefore, there is a self-
fulfilling result here: By taking more measurements
where previous research indicates functions changed
most quickly, this will lead to steeper functions where
more measurements are taken.
The same logic can be applied to classic studies
in intertemporal choice. Rachlin et al. (1991) used
hypothetical choices between an immediately avail-
able sum of money and a delayed $1,000. The open
circles in Figure 9 plot the discounted value as a func-
tion of delay. The line on the plot shows the function
predicted by decision by sampling assuming that the
set of delays presented provides the comparison set.
As for the Gonzalez and Wu (1999) data, the function
predicted under this simple rank hypothesis shows
the same qualitative pattern seen in the empirical
function. The discounting function is roughly hyper-
bolic because of the geometrically spaced distribution
of delays chosen by Rachlin et al. (1991). Virtually all
discounting studies use this kind of distribution of
delay.
Figure 9 An Empirically Derived Discounting Function from
Rachlin et al. (1991), Showing the Discounted Value
of a Delayed $1,000
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Notes. Circles plot the function that Rachlin et al. recovered. The solid line
plots the predictions of decision-by-sampling theory.
7.4. Neuroeconomic Evidence
Our experimental results are consistent with recent
evidence of coding of relative value within the brain
(for a review, see Seymour and McClure 2008). For
example, Tremblay and Schultz (1999) recorded from
single cells in the macaque orbitofrontal cortex. Cells
fired more strongly on presentation of a piece of
apple as a reward when the other available reward
was a piece of cereal (which monkeys do not like
that much) compared to when the other available
reward was a raisin (which monkeys love): The value
of the apple was coded relative to the other reward
available on that choice. In contrast, Padoa-Schioppa
and Assad (2008) find choice-invariant responding.
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With intermixed choices between quantities of three
juices, macaque orbitofrontal cortex neurons respond
to the absolute quantity of juice available, irrespec-
tive of which other juice is presented in the choice.
The value of a juice was coded independently of
the other juice available on that choice. These two
findings are reconciled by noting that Tremblay and
Schultz (1999) blocked their choice pairs, but choice
pairs were randomly intermixed for Padoa-Schioppa
and Assad (2008). Therefore, the findings of relative
value responding by Tremblay and Schultz (1999) and
choice-invariant responding by Padoa-Schioppa and
Assad (2008) are consistent with orbitofrontal cortex
neurons encoding the value of rewards relative to
other rewards within the current block, rather than
just within the immediate choice.
Mullett and Tunney (2013) find exactly this block
dependency using functional magnetic resonance
imaging in humans. In some blocks, participants saw
prizes of £0.10, £0.20, and £0.30, and in other blocks
participants saw prizes of £5.00, £7.00, and £10.00.
The activity in the ventral striatum and thalamus was
sensitive to the relative value of a prize within a
block. The activity in the ventral medial prefrontal
cortex and the anterior cingulate cortex was sensi-
tive to the rank of the prize across the whole exper-
iment. Mullett and Tunney (2013) can discriminate
between sensitivity to value and sensitivity to rank
because across the whole experiment the distribu-
tion of prizes is not uniform. As Mullett and Tunney
(2013) conclude, this pattern is as predicted by deci-
sion by sampling: prizes from the experiment enter
memory and form the context against which a cur-
rent prize is judged, with representations proportional
to the rank position of the prize within the exper-
iment context rather than the absolute value of the
prize.
7.5. Conclusion
Manipulation of the distributions of gains, risks, and
delays people experience systematically changes the
utility, weighting, and discounting functions revealed
from people’s choices. So, if we can measure lots of
utility, weighting, or discounting functions just by
changing the choices used to estimate them (whether
in the lab or the field), which functions are the “true”
functions? It may be that there is no stability within
a person and that some process like decision by sam-
pling is all there is, with the apparent stability coming
only from stability of the distribution of attribute val-
ues over time. In this case, there are no “true” func-
tions. Or it may be that people do have some stable
underlying mapping between objective and subjective
values. This is an empirical matter, but, at the least,
this mapping must be quite malleable: In our data
the effect of the attribute-value distributions is about
as large as the individual differences between people.
Decision by sampling provides a common account
of the origin of utility, weighting, and discounting
functions—and the explanation of how we were able
to change their shapes.
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Appendix A. Estimation of Utilities and Weights
In Experiments 1A–1C, we fitted Equation (A1) to estimate
the utilities of each amount:
log
[
Prob4safe5
1−Prob4safe5
]
= +  cond+ log
(
q
p
)
+  cond log
(
q
p
)
+
∑
i
iXi0 (A1)
The first term, , is an intercept. In the second term, 
is the coefficient for a dummy variable cond; cond indi-
cates condition, with 0 for positive skew and 1 for negative
skew or uniform. In the third term,  is the coefficient
for log4q/p5, the log of the ratio of the safe and risky
probabilities. In the fourth term,  is the coefficient for
the interaction of cond and log4q/p5. In the last term, the
Xi’s are dummy variables indicating the presence of each
amounti; Xi is +1 if amounti appears in the safe gamble, −1 if
amounti appears in the risky gamble, or 0 if amounti does not
appear in the choice. The i’s are coefficients for the amount
dummies.
Though it is perhaps not obvious, Equation (A1) is a rear-
rangement of Equation (3) if we set
log4biascond5= + cond 1 (A2)
cond =+ cond 1 (A3)
and
ucond4amounti5= exp4i/cond50 (A4)
The advantage of Equation (A1) is that this is the standard
form for a logistic regression with the choice on each trial
as the dependent variables and cond, log4q/p5, and the Xi’s
as independent variables. If one treats the data as coming
from one single participant and fits Equation (3) by maxi-
mum likelihood, exactly the same parameter estimates are
obtained as when Equation (A1) is fitted as a logistic regres-
sion within any standard statistics package.
Of course, it is not appropriate to ignore the within-
subjects nature of the design. Responses will be correlated
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within each participant, and this means that responses are
not independent. But because we can use the logistic regres-
sion form in Equation (A1), we are able to use off-the-shelf
methods to deal with the repeated observations for each
participant by fitting the model as a mixed effect logis-
tic regression. The fixed effects part of the model is given
by Equation (A1). The random effects part of the model
included random intercepts and full random slopes for each
participant. It is the ucond4amounti5 values that are of pri-
mary concern because these indicate the utilities of the
amounts in each condition. These are the estimates plotted
in Figure 4.
For Experiments 2A and 2B, where probability weights
are estimated, amounts are swapped with probabilities so
that the roles of p and x and of q and y are exchanged in
Equation (A1) to give
log
[
Prob4safe5
1−Prob4safe5
]
= +  cond+ log
(
y
x
)
+  cond log
(
y
x
)
+
∑
i
iXi 1(A5)
where the Xi’s are now dummies for the probabilities and
wcond4p5= exp4i/cond5.
For Experiments 3A and 3B, where utilities are estimated
from intertemporal choices, p is exchanged with 1/t, where
t is the longer delay, and q is exchanged with 1/u where, u
is the shorter delay, to give
log
[
Prob4safe5
1−Prob4safe5
]
= +  cond+ log
(
t
u
)
+  cond log
(
t
u
)
+
∑
i
iXi0 (A6)
For Experiment 4, where delay weights are estimated, we
used
log
[
Prob4safe5
1−Prob4safe5
]
= +  cond+ log
(
y
x
)
+  cond log
(
y
x
)
+
∑
i
iXi0 (A7)
Appendix B. Using Parametric Forms to
Test Curvature
In Experiments 1A–1C, we fitted Equation (B1) to test for
differences in the curvature of the utility functions:
log
[
Prob4safe5
1−Prob4safe5
]
= + cond+log
(
q
p
)
+ condlog
(
q
p
)
+ log
(
y
x
)
+ condlog
(
y
x
)
0 (B1)
Here we set
log4biascond5= + cond 1 (B2)
cond =+ cond 1 (B3)
and
cond =
 + cond
cond
0 (B4)
If the unspecified utility function in Equation (3) is replaced
with a power function ucond4x5= x
cond , then Equation (B1) is
just a rearrangement of Equation (3), and, as above, fitting
Equations (3) and (B1) is equivalent.
As above, we deal with the repeated observations of each
participant by fitting the model as a mixed effects logis-
tic regression. The fixed effects part of the model is given
by Equation (B1). The random effects part of the model
included random intercepts and full random slopes for each
participant. It is the estimates of 0 and 1 and the differ-
ence between them that gives the critical test of the differ-
ence in utility function curvature between conditions.
For Experiments 2A and 2B, we fit
log
[
Prob4safe5
1−Prob4safe5
]
= + cond+log
(
y
x
)
+ condlog
(
y
x
)
+ log
(
q
p
)
+ condlog
(
q
p
)
1 (B5)
where wcond4p5= p
cond , and bias, , and  are given by Equa-
tions (B2)–(B4).
For Experiments 3A and 3B, we fit
log
[
Prob4safe5
1−Prob4safe5
]
= + cond+log
(
t
u
)
+ condlog
(
t
u
)
+ log
(
y
x
)
+ condlog
(
y
x
)
1 (B6)
where ucond4x5= x
cond , and bias, , and  are given by Equa-
tions (B2)–(B4). For Experiment 4, we fit
log
[
Prob4safe5
1−Prob4safe5
]
= + cond+log
(
y
x
)
+ condlog
(
y
x
)
+ log
(
t
u
)
+ condlog
(
t
u
)
1 (B7)
where wcond4t5 = 1/t
cond , and bias, , and  are given by
Equations (B2)–(B4).
For each experiment, Figure B.1 shows the estimates of
bias, , and  for each condition together with bootstrapped
95% confidence intervals. The left column shows the param-
eter estimates with a solid confidence interval for the posi-
tive condition and a dashed confidence interval for the other
condition (uniform or negative, depending on the experi-
ment). There are panels for each experiment. The value 1
is marked with a horizontal dotted line. For bias, 1 indi-
cates no bias; for , 1 indicates probability matching; and
for , 1 indicates a linear utility function, linear proba-
bility weighting function, or hyperbolic delay discounting.
The right column shows a confidence interval for the dif-
ference in the parameter estimates. The top row plots bias
and bias differences. That the red confidence intervals do
not include zero (the dotted line) for bias difference esti-
mates for Experiments 1B, 1C, 2B, and 4 indicates significant
differences in bias in these studies. The middle row shows
 and  differences. Of most interest is the bottom row,
which shows  and  differences. The 95% confidence inter-
vals for  differences are all above zero, which indicates
that in every experiment there is a significant difference
in the curvature of the utility, weighting, or discounting
function.
Raw data and full R source code are available from the
authors.
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Figure B.1 Estimates and 95% Confidence Intervals for Parameter Estimates (Left) and the Difference Between Parameters Between Conditions
(Right)
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